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POLITICS, JUSTICE AND THE VULNERABLE SUBJECT: 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF FEMINIST THOUGHT
Brunella Casalini1
Abstract: The present article argues that the 
main contribution of contemporary feminist 
theory on vulnerability stems from the 
distinction of two possible kinds of 
vulnerability: an ontological vulnerability and a 
vulnerability linked to various processes (social, 
cultural, economic and juridical) of 
vulnerabilisation. This contribution is not 
limited to the critical and deconstructive level. 
As a positive proposal, it advances in the 
direction of an individual which, recovering its 
own relational, embodied, "fleshy" and situated 
dimension, abandons the illusion of its own 
sovereignty, accepts its vulnerability like an 
opening up to others, and thus also accepts the 
responsibility for an open and democratic 
dialogue and the need for institutions inspired 
by an "enabling" conception of justice (cf. 
Young 1990). 
Keywords: vulnerability, precarity, privilege 
of ignorance, epistemic responsibility, enabling 
justice. 
    
 
Introduction 
 
Different contemporary feminist 
theoretical approaches, particularly the care 
                                                          
1 Prof. University of Florence, Italy. mail: brunella.casalini@unifi.it. 
ethics of Kittay (1998) and Tronto (1993; 
2013), studies on precarity (Butler, 2006; 2009; 
2015), the “social flesh” approach of Carol 
Bacchi and Chris Beasley (2002; 2004; 2012), 
the philosophy of the law of Martha Fineman 
(2008), the ecofeminism of authors like Val 
Plumwood (2002) and Stacy Alaimo (2009), 
have focused their attention on the subject of 
vulnerability. This thought moves on two 
separate yet closely interrelated fronts (see, in 
particular, Gilson, 2013). On the one hand, 
we have the unveiling of forms of 
vulnerabilisation, of “precarity” (Butler, 
2009), or of “pathogenic vulnerability”  
(Mackenzie, 2014), socially induced to 
maintain the current hierarchies of power that 
exist among the various social groups, focusing 
attention on the methods used to produce them 
and also on the way in which they have changed 
over recent decades due to globalisation and the 
advent of neoliberal politics. In this direction, 
especially through criticism of modern 
rationalism and liberal ontology, they help us 
understand the reasons why what Martha 
Fineman calls the “myth of autonomy” 
(Fineman, 2004) is so hard to die, so resistant 
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and solid in our imaginations, so capable of 
distracting our gaze as much as possible from 
our shared vulnerability to the point of actually 
ignoring it.  
On the other hand, these reflections 
move on the front of the elaboration of a 
different way of thinking politics which starts 
from our needs, from the body, from its 
dependence on the natural and social 
environment, from the tangible conditions that 
make social reproduction possible. The 
underlying idea, from this point of view, is that 
only by recognising our shared ontological 
vulnerability and acknowledging the way in 
which the removal processes that have allowed 
it to be ignored have worked, putting the same 
forms of social reproduction at risk, can we also 
succeed in eliminating those forms of inequality 
that now justify the inferiorisation and social 
disadvantage of certain groups, those groups 
that social sciences define as “vulnerable” 
groups (see Ferrarese: in this issue). It is my 
contention that it is from the relationship 
outlined between these two possible kinds of 
vulnerability that the essential contribution of 
the feminist theory on this matter stems, a 
contribution which is not limited to the critical 
and deconstructive level.  
As a positive proposal, it advances in 
the direction of a individual which, recovering 
its own relational, embodied, fleshy and situated 
dimension, abandons the illusion of its own 
sovereignty, accepts its vulnerability like an 
opening up to others, the responsibility for open 
and democratic dialogue and the need for 
institutions inspired by an “enabling” conception 
of justice (cf. Young, 1990). 
 
 
Ontological vulnerability and “privilege of 
ignorance” 
 
Modern political philosophy has 
proposed an image of the individual by nature 
autonomous, self-sufficient, free and 
independent. In representations of classical and 
contemporary contractualism, in particular, the 
individual appears on the political scene 
fungorum more – to use a well-known 
Hobbesian expression –, ready to go and 
perfectly mature. From the descriptive 
viewpoint, the modern vision of the individual 
rests on the ascertainment of the separateness of 
people. This vision of human nature, which 
corresponds to an undoubtedly prevalent 
empirical reality and therefore to a widespread 
experience, has been used to sustain a normative 
vision in which individual freedom is presented 
as the protection of the space of action and of 
individual choices, and political society is 
conceived as an artificial reality stemming from 
a contract, a voluntary action, with which 
individuals positioned symmetrically in relation 
to each other decide to subject themselves 
willingly to laws to protect their private lives 
and their assets (cf. Maillard, 2011). 
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This political conception of the 
individual and of human nature corresponds, at 
an epistemological level, to a vision of the 
subjects as independent as they are isolated, as 
autonomous as they are self-sufficient, the 
rationality of whom is considered as a capacity 
to detach themselves not only from links and 
from tangible situations in which people find 
themselves, but also from their temporally finite 
and materially conditioned bodily reality. As 
written by Plumwood (2002: p. 42), modern 
rationalism has conceived every form of link as 
a possible source of error. The known object is 
extraneous to the knowing subject. The latter is 
able to change and act on the known object, but 
not vice versa: the subject remains closed off 
from the known object, a timeless, detached 
mind, separate and sovereign compared to 
nature, immune from every form of affection 
and change through contact and relations with 
the outside world. The illusion on which the 
sovereign subject is erected is at the basis of a 
distorted perception of the human condition 
which leads to an overestimation of personal 
security, to an underestimation of his 
dependency and interconnection with others and 
with the environment, and to a failure to 
recognise his vulnerable personal condition. 
Rational and monological subjects have 
therefore been able to imagine themselves free 
and independent, and to remove their intrinsic 
vulnerability, projecting that vulnerability onto 
something else outside of and below human, 
and consequently excluded from the sphere of 
their privileges. The autonomy of rational 
subjects is, from this point of view, the result of 
a privilege that enables the offloading of 
damages, consequences and burdens deriving 
from the course of action that they alone are able 
to decide to undertake, onto others. Joan Tronto 
talks about “privileged  irresponsibility” 
(Tronto, 1990, 1998; but see also: G i l s o n ,  
2 0 1 1 ;  Zembylasa, Bozalekb and Sheferc, 
2014), while Eve Kosofky Sedgwick (1990) 
had used the expression “epistemological 
privilege of ignorance”, two concepts which 
appear closely connected because it is from 
ignorance, from not knowing or, better, from 
being able to allow oneself the luxury of not 
knowing certain aspects of life and the human 
condition, that a failure to undertake 
responsibility derives. 
As sustained by the contemporary 
epistemology of ignorance (cf. Tuana, 2004; 
2006; Sullivan and Tuana, 2007; Gilson, 2011; 
2013, Logue, 2013; Code, 2014), the privilege 
enjoyed by those in power derives not so 
much from their knowledge – as we tend to 
assume -, but from the fact that they are able 
to ignore part of reality, from the borders 
traced between what we have to know and 
what can be excluded from the objects of 
knowledge. In this vision, ignorance must not 
be considered so much as a lack of knowledge 
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and, consequently, of power (people today 
usually see power and knowledge as being 
linked), as a force which blocks knowledge, 
which occupies its space and more or less 
explicitly affirms a need to not know (cf. Code, 
2014: 154). According to the epistemology of 
ignorance, power is manifested not only in the 
construction of knowledge, but also, in another 
way, through the definition of what is not 
knowledge, in tracing the boundaries between 
what is worthy of being known and what is not, 
either because it doesn’t exist or is purposely not 
perceived. In this vision, ignorance is not an 
expression of bad epistemic practice, but more 
of “a substantive epistemic practice” in itself 
(Alcoff, 2006: 40). Like knowledge, ignorance 
is a social construction and even “actively 
sought after, consciously produced, strategically 
deployed, ferociously consumed, and carefully 
maintained” (Logue, 2013: 53). 
The main instrument used by modern 
thought to erect that boundary between human 
and non human which has been essential in order 
to maintain the privilege of being able to ignore 
corporeity, meaning what makes us vulnerable 
and exposed to others at all times, has been the 
use of dualism, in the various forms in which it 
can be presented: nature/culture, body/mind, 
                                                          
2 The imperative of the deconstruction of dualism and of 
its impoverished interpretation of reality is at the centre 
today, in particular, of the so-called “New Materialist 
Feminism”. In this recent philosophical perspective, this 
second wave of feminism has erroneously given in to the 
subject/object, reason/sentiment, male/female, 
able/disable, socio-cultural forces/materiality2. 
Dualism was the foundation for the centrist 
conceptual structures that have been hegemonic 
in the West: androcentrism, ethnocentrism, 
eurocentrism, which have, in turn, legitimised 
different forms of racism, sexism, colonialism 
and speciesism. Dualism – as highlighted by 
Val Plumwood (2002: 101) – is not a simple 
dichotomy: it is not a mere distinction, but a 
form of distancing and disassociation between 
the elements that are separated, so much so as 
to generate an authentic ontological rupture 
between them, a radical discontinuity between 
the group which identifies the centre and its 
other which is not just separate, but placed on the 
lowest steps of a hierarchical order. The separate 
other, disassociated from the centre, is marked 
as inferior. Once inferiorised, and set at a 
distance, it can easily appear to be inessential. It 
can be ignored or used instrumentally. 
Therefore, dualism produces inequality, 
dominion and de-responsibility on the moral 
front, in relation to that which and those who 
have been inferiorised. The inferiorised other is 
also vulnerabilised, via exclusion from the 
distribution of the advantages of social 
cooperation and the weight of burdens which 
temptation of dualism, in the moment that it wanted the 
women to be moved “from the category of nature to the 
kingdom of culture” (Alaimo, 2008, 239, cit. in 
Wingrove, 2015). On the meaning of the recovery of 
materiality and biology of the new materialist feminism, 
see also Casalini (2015). 
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are not recognised as such. What Plumwood 
describes as a “hyper-separation” makes it 
possible to brand the other in order to reserve 
him or her a differentiated and unequal 
treatment: the different nature of men with 
respect to women, like colonisers with 
respect to those colonised, has been used to 
justify the exclusion of women and those 
colonised from the enjoyment of particular 
things, exonerating men from having to feel 
empathy and excluding a reason for having to 
discuss existing inequalities. The clear 
separation of the boundaries between the 
sovereign subject (male, white, proprietor, 
heterosexual and able-bodied) and his other has 
been a tool for the legitimisation of his dominant 
position and, at the same time, the reassurance 
of his non-dependence and invulnerability (cf. 
Plumwood, 2002: 102). 
Among the mechanisms that can help 
eliminate our vulnerability and build the 
boundaries that distance it from the fragile 
construction of the autonomous, free, self-
sufficient and independent subject, as shown by 
Joan Tronto's political ethics of care (1998; 
2013), is the devaluation of all those forms of 
practical knowledge and of activity aimed at 
                                                          
3 The request for recognition of the “non-natural” 
nature of care activities, so that they could be listed as 
falling rightfully within the “work” sphere, was one of the 
main claims of materialist feminism (cf. Delphy, 2009) 
and of Marxist feminism (cf. Federici, 2012) in the 
Sixties and Seventies. The naturalisation of this work has 
sustained the pretence which sees it as falling into the 
caring for and taking responsibility for those 
who are not self-sufficient, and the 
marginalisation and relegation to the private 
sphere of  all those asymmetric relations which 
implicate affective attention and interest in the 
other in order to satisfy physical or affective 
needs. Considering caring activities as natural 
and irrelevant from the political point of view or 
in terms of productive work, and entrusting 
them to unpaid work by women, man was able 
to exercise patriarchal power, seen as the fruit 
of a natural superiority, for a long time, and this 
enabled him to gain an advantage from 
women’s taking on of responsibility for 
children, the sick and elderly and even his own 
daily life, without granting them any form of 
public recognition. These caring activities, 
while having finally been denaturalised and 
considered as a job3, still continue to be done by 
women, especially women who are poor, 
immigrant and members of ethnic minorities, 
while society adopts complete disregard for, and 
a fundamental desire to ignore, just how hard 
this work is and how crucial in terms of social 
reproduction. This disinterest and this desire 
not to know are functional to maintaining a 
position of advantage by those who are 
sphere of subsistence (without an exchange value) and 
has, at the same time, justified its low remuneration, 
considered as a mere supplement to the salary of the man 
of the house, the only person really capable of supporting 
the family, as well as the temporary, part-time and 
unqualified nature of most of the activities that fall within 
the care sector. 
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privileged and, at the same time, the 
disadvantage of those who do not occupy that 
position: the person needing care who does not 
have a privileged social status will see his or her 
needs underestimated or ignored, while the 
caregiver will be forced, as highlighted by 
Fineman (1995; 2004 and in this issue) and 
Kittay (1998), into a form of derived or 
secondary dependency, with consequent 
restriction of the space for opportunities of 
wellbeing. 
The same attitude of domination and 
exoneration from responsibility is taken by 
modern man towards the broader kingdom of 
nature, in which woman has been traditionally 
included. In this case too, the social privilege 
works in such a way as to isolate its beneficiaries 
from the damage that it causes to the 
environment, making it hard for them to see the 
way in which it affects particularly those who 
are weaker, poorer and disadvantaged (see 
Fineman: in this issue). In this way, the effects 
of the atmospheric pollution produced by 
human activities in advanced industrial societies 
do not pose an equally distributed risk. Its 
effects do not fall on the whole population in the 
same way: the rich are usually affected less than 
the poor. So, for example, it isn’t true that 
“poverty is hierarchical, while smog i s  
democratic”, as claimed by Beck (cit. in 
Plumwood, 2003: 84). The map of smog of 
Sidney, for example, shows a close relationship 
between the most polluted areas and the poorest 
areas (cf. ibidem). Even global warming has a 
different effect on the poorer segments of the 
population, as emerged in Chicago in summer 
1995, when an exceptional heatwave caused 
500 deaths in the districts where residents 
couldn’t afford air conditioning (cf. ibidem). 
 
 
The differential distribution of vulnerability 
 
The removal of the datum of our 
ontological vulnerability and of our belonging to 
a global ecological community, or the possibility 
by modern man to ignore this reality, is linked, 
therefore, to the construction of imaginary 
boundaries which work and have long worked to 
keep human beings separated from the rest of the 
animal world, rationality from corporeity, the 
mind from the body, the person who enjoys full 
citizenship rights from one who exists in a 
condition of dimidiate citizenship, the pretence 
of being the owner of oneself and one’s body 
and, consequently, in control of oneself, from 
the individual in need of “contention”, public 
from private, culture from nature. These 
boundaries, which – as we will see – do not rest 
only on the forms in which knowledge and 
ignorance were built, and therefore only on 
cognitive dynamics, but also on affective 
dynamics which influence the feelings aroused 
by certain bodies or situations, have allowed 
modern human beings to cultivate the illusion of 
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their own invulnerability while attributing 
vulnerability to particular individuals and 
groups. We can see this as a process in which 
the dominant group hoards opportunities, either 
purposely or without being aware of it (Tilly, 
1998; Anderson 2013). This generates a 
differential distribution of precarity or 
vulnerability – as observed by Judith Butler 
(2009). In this perspective, vulnerability 
becomes not a universal characteristic, but a 
negative, stigmatising feature, which justifies 
and has historically justified paternalistic 
behaviours. 
To take into account the difference 
evoked thus far between ontological 
vulnerability and vulnerability produced via 
differential distribution, Judith Butler – starting 
from Frames of War (2009) – distinguishes 
between precariousness and precarity. 
Precariousness is that form of vulnerability 
universally shared by all human beings, and also 
characterising non-human animals, which has 
to do with our bodily, fleshy nature, which 
makes us needy of food and a roof over our 
heads, and makes us vulnerable to violence, to 
injury. By virtue of the body, which, according 
to Butler (2014: 58), is “synonymous with 
‘mortality’, ‘vulnerability’ and ‘action’”, 
human animals are exposed to each other from 
birth and need to build with others networks of 
trust and support. Exposure to others makes us 
vulnerable to violence (physical and moral) as 
well as to contact and caresses: for Butler – and 
also for Cavarero (2007; 2014) – vulnerability 
does not refer exclusively to the negative 
dimension of wounds and damage, and to a lack 
of power, but also to the positive dimension of 
care and love. Our very survival depends on the 
political organisation of social conditions 
which guarantee interdependence and 
proximity. It is our exposure to others which 
allows us to live and experience the deepest and 
most important feelings in our life. 
The link that precariousness, our 
dependency and interdependency determine is 
not voluntary and consensual, does not pass – 
according to Butler – from the mediation of a 
moment of will and deliberation: “it precedes 
the contract, and is often effaced by those forms 
of social contract that depend on an ontology of 
volitional individuals” (Butler, 2009: xxvi). To 
a certain extent, because our ontology is a social 
ontology, and our being is always exposed to 
others, to social regulations and to the political 
and social structures historically given, we can 
never know precariousness if not in the forms of 
precarity. Vulnerability is, therefore, universal 
in the form of precariousness and, at the same 
time, particular in the form of precarity. As 
individuals, we are diversely positioned in relation 
to the experience of vulnerability, “it cannot be 
properly thought of outside a differentiated field of 
power and, specifically, the differential operation of 
norms of recognition” (Butler, 2006: 44). 
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It is not just the physical and mental 
differences between individuals and the 
networks of social relations that we are part of 
that determine our diverse vulnerability. Butler 
attributes the differential experience of 
vulnerability not only to the effects of specific 
networks of social and political institutions, but 
also to the effects of regulatory standards, 
perceptive schemes and intelligibility, as well 
as to historically variable affective structures, 
through which we experience ourselves and our 
bodies. Media portrayals also make an essential 
contribution to these emotional and perceptive 
structures today, used to create particular 
affective states in the public opinion. The media 
portrayal of vulnerability is one of the tools 
used to exercise contemporary biopower. 
Thanks to the way in which our perceptive and 
emotional schemes work, we mostly tend to 
remove the universal character of vulnerability 
to attribute and distribute it differentially, so 
that certain lives are recognised as worth being 
lived, while others do not receive the same 
recognition, are not recognisable and 
recognised as lives, are not considered worthy 
of mourning and tears, and consequently 
become more easily subject to violence, 
remaining more easily lacking in protection and 
care. The regulations that support our 
perceptive, emotional and cognitive schemes 
become, in this way – according to Butler and 
to Sedgwick, Tronto and Plumwood –, the 
means used to socially justify, in terms of 
common sense, what Iris Marion Young (1990: 
chap. V) would call a “hierarchy of bodies”, 
which decides the unequal distribution of 
essential things, which is therefore both a 
symbolic and tangible matter. This hierarchy of 
bodies is maintained not only by rational 
arguments and discussions, but also by our 
emotions: the objects towards which disgust 
and empathy are directed, for example, are not 
immune to the perpetuation of forms of 
inequality through the reification or 
sentimentalisation of the other – as also 
emphasised in the work of Martha Nussbaum 
(2001; 2004; 2013). This differential 
distribution of vulnerability, which works 
through processes of “othering”, is what Butler 
calls “precarity”. Precarity and othering are 
an essential part of the defensive dynamics 
entered into to ward off the fear of 
vulnerability, dynamics that always contain a 
dose of symbolic or tangible violence towards 
the other and are supported on the basis of 
particular affective infrastructures. These 
processes take on variable and historically 
determined features, but differential 
distribution strategies of precarity are always 
entered into, according to Butler, in the 
governance of a population. Current neoliberal 
policies have contributed to creating new forms 
of vulnerabilisation and precarity through the 
rhetoric of individual choice, the consequent 
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attribution to the individual of responsibility for 
his/her personal condition and the progressive 
dismantling of the social protection network 
provided by the welfare state. Called upon to 
be the manager of him/herself and responsible 
for his/her own self-sufficiency, in a context in 
which neoliberalism destroys the very 
possibility of the self-sufficiency at economic 
and social level, the individual remains 
sentimentally attached to this ideal4, even if it 
cannot be achieved, undergoing a psychic 
transformation determined by a growing state 
of anxiety and of “moral failure” (cf. Butler, 
2015: 15). 
 
 
 
The embodied, relational and vulnerable 
subject, between epistemic responsibility 
and politics  
 
Contemporary politics have opposed 
the imagery created by modern philosophy, a 
social and political imagery which conceives 
autonomy as independence, stigmatising 
dependency, which sees freedom as an absence 
of ties and conceives rationalism as achievable 
only if the subject is capable of detaching 
him/herself from his/her situation and looking 
at the world from nowhere, with an 
“establishing imagery” – to use the 
                                                          
4 Butler specifically refers to the theory of affections 
drawn up by Lauren Berlant in Cruel Optimism (2011) 
(cf. Butler, 2015b: 15). 
terminology of Castoriadis (1991) –, which is 
formulated via the critical distancing from the 
idea of a sovereign, atomistic, egotistical 
subject, whose knowledge derives from an 
attitude of complete detachment and 
abstraction with regard to the known object.  
This distancing has consequences on 
numerous levels. The first – and this comes as 
no surprise due to the reconstruction proposed 
here – is the epistemological level: there is a 
debate on whether there is just one way of 
knowing, which is that of the detached 
spectator, devoid of all passion, which can but 
produce, due to its distance and separateness 
from the known object, an impersonal and 
impartial vision, equipped with a claim of 
universal validity. The dimension of the 
distance of the knowing, universal and abstract 
subject, in relation to the known object, that 
distance which guaranteed invulnerability, is 
now replaced by that of a situated subject, 
which has always been placed in the 
environment and in interaction with it. The 
knowledge is now inevitably connected 
from the position that the knowing subject 
occupies as a body in space: it is this 
positioning that makes knowledge possible 
while limiting it at the same time. I can 
acknowledge my experiences, even to myself, 
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only if I do not see myself as an isolated 
individual; as Anne Sellar wrote: “as an 
isolated individual, I often do not know what 
my experiences are” (cit. in Code, 2016). For 
Wittgenstein too, Lorraine Code reminds us, 
“knowledge is in the end based on 
acknowledgement” (cit. ibidem). 
The epistemology of ignorance, which 
acknowledges no responsibility towards what is 
outside its cognitive interests, is replaced by the 
reference to an unavoidable “epistemic 
responsibility” (Code, 1987) which has to 
make us critically assess the circumstances in 
which knowledge (including that of a scientific 
nature which we usually consider neutral) is 
produced and cultivate a form of “epistemic 
vulnerability” (Gilson,  2011;  2013), which is 
presented as an antidote to the closure on which 
the pretence of invulnerability of modern man 
rests. Invulnerability built on non-knowledge 
and ignorance of the other rests on the creation 
of ever-new inequalities and prevents the 
understanding of the conditions of our very 
existence, placing it in danger. Switching from 
this conception of the subject to another vision 
does not mean simply changing a conceptual 
scheme of reference, because – as Lorraine 
Code explains – revisionist conceptual schemes 
are also effective at practical and tangible level, 
in that they are capable of putting a conceptual 
apparatus into place which infiltrates into the 
social order and can upset the hierarchical 
structures that hold it up (cf. Code, 2006: 20). 
Abandoning fantasies of 
invulnerability, built on rigid closures and 
separations, means arriving at a point where we 
feel morally and politically responsible for 
listening to the perspectives of the different 
social groups, giving voice to marginal 
subjects, abandoning the pretence of an 
unrelated sovereign subject, and the perceptive 
and emotional schemes that have sustained the 
privileges of the dominant subject, to imagine a 
form of dialogical rationality attentive to the 
context and open towards diversity. This can be 
helped by a “pedagogy of epistemic 
vulnerability” (Logue, 2013) and a “critical 
pedagogy of emotions” (Zembylasa, Bozalekb 
and Sheferc, 2014) which cultivates in 
individuals the desire to know and open up 
towards others, discussing consolidated and 
reassuring truths and overcoming negative 
emotions linked to stereotypes or reactions of 
fear of the other, which makes us see the 
uncertainty, insecurity and doubt that lead us 
towards the other in search of solidarity and 
dialogue as strengths rather than weaknesses.   
“Epistemic vulnerability” and “critical 
pedagogy of emotions” seem to be essential 
conditions for democratic life itself. Habits 
founded on the privilege of epistemic 
ignorance, whether they concern the privilege 
of whiteness, obligatory heterosexuality or 
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sexism, prevent full and equal social 
cooperation, interaction and mutual learning, 
contributing to fuelling intolerance and closure 
towards others. Defeating these incorporated 
and interiorised schemes of action, which 
influence behaviour without our being aware of 
it, is not easy, but it is essential within a 
democratic society. It is of particular interest 
for democracy to correct epistemic injustice in 
order to guarantee that equal and free 
participation and that equal respect that are 
fundamental in order to gain a cognitive and 
cooperative advantage from differences (cf. 
Anderson, 2006). This is particularly true if we 
adhere to a conception of democracy which is 
not restricted to the moment of the majority 
vote or to the moment of the resolution, but is 
seen as a cognitive research process in which an 
essential role is played by the pluralism of 
prospects, the friction and confrontation 
between these and the resolution as a mental 
experiment which puts different solutions to the 
problems that occur to the test at imaginative 
level, trying to prefigure the consequences. In 
this vision, which leads us to smudge the 
borders between ethics, political philosophy, 
social sciences and epistemology, the wealth is 
made up of experiences ad imageries of 
resistance (Medina, 2013), capable of 
developing epistemic virtues which allow us to 
look at things differently. They offer 
interpretative resources via which to subject the 
knowledge acquired to a fallibilistic test, 
forcing us to maintain an attitude of humility 
and open-mindedness. 
Democratic epistemic interaction not 
only perfects our practices, it also expands our 
imagination and our sensitivity. Thus 
democracy finds itself in a position which 
should make it a natural ally of which  Iris 
Marion Young (1990) calls an “enabling” 
conception of justice, meaning a conception 
which extends way beyond the distributive 
schemes of the liberal theories of justice and 
comprises the effective possibility for everyone 
to participate, express their needs and, even 
before this, develop individual capabilities for 
effective and productive social cooperation and 
communication, starting from the cognitive and 
affective capacities and progressing through to 
“hermeneutic responsibility”, meaning the 
obligation to look at personal limitations and 
epistemic vulnerability, to maintain an 
openness towards others which takes mutual 
positioning into account (Medina, 2013). 
Starting from the body, and from its 
vulnerability, should induce us to remember 
our position determined in space and time, the 
start and the end of every life, birth, illnesses 
and death, the inevitable changes in body and 
mind over time, our everyday bodily needs, at 
material, social and affective level, fatigue, 
suffering, love, joy and our belonging to the 
natural world. An “enabling concept of justice”, 
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which takes the datum of corporeity, and 
consequently its needs, seriously, along with 
the diversity and the ties that indissolubly bind 
us to and make us dependent on the 
environment, should push us towards what Joan 
Tronto describes as a “caring democracy” 
(2013), a democracy in which the 
responsibilities of care and social reproduction 
are no longer allocated in such a way that the 
more privileged can ignore the work, burden 
and costs that they implicate. In this sense, 
starting from vulnerability means thinking 
about a policy which is able to reinvent the 
welfare state, not take it apart, in a democratic 
and not paternalistic direction, and which is 
able, at the same time, to cope with the limits of 
development, inaugurating a dialogue with the 
natural world that no longer relegates it to a 
passive condition as an infinitely exploitable 
and available resource.   
Some of the attempts at inaugurating 
another, different “establishing imagery” 
underway today  consist in the important 
alliance between the feminist movement and the 
environmentalist movement, which has taken 
place in numerous countries, starting with 
action to create a coalition policy which – as 
                                                          
5 Stacy Alaimo writes: “When Spencer Tunick, for 
example, posed hundreds of people on a melting iceberg 
to protest global warming the term used to articulate 
people and place on the Greenpeace website’s account 
of this event was ‘vulnerability’: “Without clothes, the 
human body is vulnerable, exposed, its life or death at 
the whim of the elements. Global warming is stripping 
away our glaciers and leaving our entire planet 
explained by De Chiro (2008) – revolves 
around the “needs linked to the support of 
everyday life”, that is what contemporary 
Marxist feminism defines “social 
reproduction”. This need to refer back to life’s 
most immediate needs is expressed also in the 
manifestation and spectacularisation of 
vulnerability, sometimes in the form of nudity 
(think of the protest groups Bare Witness and 
Baring Witness, the photos taken by Spencer 
Tunick to draw attention to environmentalist 
battles over global warming5), often used 
recently by various social movements as an 
instrument of resistance (see also Butler, 2015), 
to draw attention to our interdependence as 
physical creatures and our dependence on 
specific environmental and material conditions. 
The new forms of vulnerability induced by 
neoliberal policies, with the dismantling of the 
welfare state and the precariousness of 
employment, have put an increasing number of 
people at risk of precarity, who, according to 
Butler, by taking part in recent demonstrations 
all over the world, from Plaza del Sol to Tahrir 
Square, Syntagma Square, and Zuccotti Park, 
have, with their bodily presence in public 
vulnerable to extreme weather, floods, sea level rise, 
global decreases in carrying capacity and agricultural 
production, fresh water shortages, disease and mass 
human dislocations (“600 Strip Naked” 2007)” 
(Alaimo, 2009: 23).  More generally, see: Alaimo, 
2010;  Beasly and Bacchi, 2012. 
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spaces, expressed the demand for better social, 
economic and political living conditions (cf. 
Butler, 2015b). The very same politicisation of 
vulnerability, through its assumption and 
performative riappropriation (cf. Darling, 
2009), has been deployed more and more times 
in many different places, the last one being in 
March 2016 in the Calais refugee camp, by 
those asylum seekers who sewed their lips and 
held cartels saying “We are humans!” to protest 
against their “bare life” (Agamben, 1998) 
conditions in the camp. In all these cases, the 
activist's body, and the spectacle of his 
vulnerability, is used a “fleshy” weapon or tool 
that activates affective forces and so can be 
used – as Knudsen e Stage write (2015: 89) – as 
a “soft power” or “biopolitical medium” in 
order to create through imagination new forms 
of relationships between victimised and non-
victimised bodies. 
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